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Abstract. There are two logics of the functioning of science as an
institution: the logic of production and dissemination of knowledge
oriented to solve existing socio-economic problems and the logic of
survival of members of the profession. These two logics could contradict
each other. The first logic corresponds to the fulfilment by the science of
its social task. The second corresponds to aspirations of members of any
social organism to survive as members of this organism. To our mind
Pragmatist Institutional Economics can fulfil successfully its social task
but could have enormous problems to become a normal science in the
sense of Thomas Khun. Economic realities are very complex, determined
to a large degree by cultural heritage but at the same time very dynamic.
Knowledge concerning these realities for different countries, and even for
different regions and different economic sectors inside the same
countries, in different periods of time can hardly be presented on the
basis of the same categories. It means that communication between
members of the modern community of academic economists, which is to a
great extent international, is difficult. In this situation advantages for
career oriented academic economists for the creation of their
professional communities on the basis of Cartesianism rather than
Pragmatism are obvious. This paper is an appeal to economists to adopt
the pragmatist method which, in its modern form related to social
sciences, is Qualitative Research.
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Introduction
The movement of New Institutional Economics – NIE – [28, 50], born in the
seventies, followed the Institutional Economics of John R. Commons (1934a) by
putting the notion of «transaction» in the centre of its study. The seventies were a
period of appearance of an absolute authority of neoclassical economics with its
hypothetico-deductive (Cartesian and positivist) methodology and the NIE
followed this methodology. Most of the participants of this movement believed that
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their field could just be an extension of the mainstream economics and that they
could use similar quantitative techniques. The NIE was assimilated by many of the
members of its community to «transaction costs economics». In this way they have
distorted totally the initial design of Commons’ institutional economics who saw
the transaction as a unit of activity common to law, economics and ethics [9].
Instead of Cartesian analytic philosophy, which is the philosophical foundation of
neoclassical economic theory, he based his institutional economics on pragmatist
philosophy of Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey. As Philip Mirowski has noted
«these two traditions have a profound conflict over their respective images of a
«science», and therefore profoundly incompatible images of «economic man» and
«rationality» [53]. Commons used the pragmatism as a model of human behaviour
and as a method of research. If the former becomes more and more popular, the
latter is ignored or rejected by the majority of modern institutionalists, either
advocates of new or old institutional economics. It happens because at present the
hypothetico-deductive thinking dominates almost the totality of the community of
academic economists.
Social science thought flows based on Pragmatism, Institutionalism in
economics and Chicago school in sociology [88], were very influential in the
United States between two wars. Later their influence fell and empirical research in
economics based on pragmatism almost disappeared. Beginning from the second
half of the 20th century the American Institutionalism only attracted the attention
of historians of economic thought and specialists in economic methodology. Some
of them made an outstanding contribution to the understanding of its pragmatist
nature [71, 53, 7, 13, 3], but many others did not share pragmatist views of
Commons. They concentrated on developing theoretical notions using as main
references writings of founders (Veblen, Commons, Mitchell). Geoffrey Hodgson,
one of the leaders of this stream, has taken a militant anti-empiricist position by
declaring that empirical evidence has only residual importance in economic
research [37]. Most of modern advocates of old institutional economics are out of
touch of real economic problems and empirically oriented Commons is criticised as
a poor theorist [39]. Most members of this community are not doing any empirical
studies themselves and even their theoretical considerations usually appeal
exclusively to theoretical considerations of others and not to any results of
empirical studies.
Many modern institutional economists criticise Old Institutional Economics for
its descriptive character and lack of rigorous and systematic theory. Pragmatically
oriented sociologists developed a method called Grounded Theory [29, 86, 47],
which reconciles description and theorising. Empirical research in the framework
of this method is used not to test theories or hypotheses created before its start but
to create concepts, theories and hypotheses deeply rooted in the collected data.
Grounded Theory is the most sophisticated method entering the set of
pragmatically oriented social research methods called Qualitative Research
[18, 70]. One of them is case study method, another one is a method of field
experiments called Action Research [32, 87, 72] which has large applications in the
study of organisations. Pragmatist economic laboratory experiments based on
gaming-simulation [31, 100] could oppose neoclassical experimental economics.
Grounded Theory, Action Research as Qualitative Research in general and
laboratory gaming-simulation experiments can be used for economic research. The
aim of this paper is to attract the attention of economists to the tremendous unused
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potential of the application of pragmatist methodology. The paper discusses the
pragmatist methodology and techniques from an institutional economist point of
view. The paper is based on a personal experience of the author in application of
these methodology and techniques for economic institutional investigations
[101-104].
1. Pragmatism versus Cartesianism and positivism
Descartes was very suspicious to results of observations. He was sure that the
senses deceive us and all the things that we see are false. He appealed to doubt in
everything. At the same time he was convinced that where the senses fail, the mind
triumphs. It influenced very negatively a vision of science: «Cartesianism
destroyed the balance which underlies true science: the balance between thinking
and observing, deduction and induction, imagination and common sense, reflection
and action, reason and passion, abstract thinking and realism, the world within and
the world without the mind. Under the impact of Cartesianism the second element
of the equation was sacrificed to the first [...] Descartes’ epistemological reflections
opened an era of axiomatic, unhistorical, deductive thinking broadly called the
Enlightenment» [52]. The Cartesian dualism with its separation of knowing from
doing, object from subject, fact from value, theory from practice serves an
epistemological foundation for neoclassical economics [7].
The founder of Pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, understood the historical context
of appearance of Cartesianism. Descartes revolted against authority as the ultimate
source of truth and allowed theoretically scepticism.  Afterwards «that done, he
sought a more natural fountain of true principles, and professed to find it in the
human mind» [63]. In this way, he underestimated the role of observation by
overestimating the role of human thinking. According to Peirce, we cannot doubt in
everything: «A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to
doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a
positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim» [62, pp. 28, 29].
Peirce estimated that «machinery of the mind can only transform knowledge, but
never originate it, unless it be fed with facts of observation. Nothing new can ever
be learned by analysing definitions» [63, p. 126]. He has noticed that scholars are
«less intent on finding out what the facts are, than on inquiring what belief is most
in harmony with their system. It is hard to convince a follower of the a priori
method by adducing facts»  [63, p. 138].
One of the central notions of Peircian philosophy is that of belief : «Our beliefs
guide our desires and shape our actions (…) Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied
state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief;
while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid, or to
change to a belief in anything else (…) Both doubt and belief have positive effects
upon us, though very different ones. Belief does not make us act at once, but puts
us into such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way, when the occasion
arises. Doubt has not the least effect of this sort, but stimulates us to action until it
is destroyed (…) The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief.
I shall term this struggle inquiry (…) That the settlement of opinion is the sole end
of inquiry is a very important proposition. It sweeps away, at once, various vague
and erroneous conceptions of proof» [62a, pp. 114, 115].
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Another notion of this philosophy closely linked with the notion of belief is that
of habit.  The belief «involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action,
or, say for short a habit  (…) The whole function of thought is to produce habits of
action. (…) To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what
habits it involves» [63, pp. 129, 131]. For Peirce «belief is not a momentary mode
of consciousness; it is a habit of mind essentially enduring for some time (…)
Instead of saying that you want to know the «Truth», you were simply to say that
you want  to  attain a  state  of  belief  unassailable  by doubt» [66,  p.  336].  Based on
the Peirce’s Pragmatism, we can say that social reality is a reality of beliefs and
habits. It means that this reality is socially constructed by the processes of
institutionalisation, legitimation and socialisation [4]. The social reality is
historical: «Institutions cannot be created instantaneously. Institutions always have
a history, of which they are the products. It is impossible to understand an
institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it
was produced» [4, p. 72].
Peirce saw the research as a collective action of investigators who, by observing
and by analysing something separately, gradually converge on the results of
investigation. «The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion
is  the  real.  That  is  way  I  would  explain  reality»  [63,  p.  139].  In  this  way,  the
«Cartesianism’s guiding notion of the solitary doubting ego is supplanted by the
idea of a co-operative search for truth for the purpose of coping with real problems
encountered in the course of action» [41, p. 19]. The consequences of this
transformation of the guiding idea of philosophical reflection are extremely far-
reaching: «Indeed, the entire relationship between cognition and reality is changed.
The concept of truth no longer expresses a correct representation of reality in
cognition, which can be conceived of using the metaphor of a copy, rather, it
expresses an increase of the power to act in relation to an environment. All stages
of cognition, from sensory perception through to the logical drawing of conclusions
and on self-reflection, must be conceived anew» [41, pp. 19, 20].
The selective character of the perception shown by William James [40], a
follower of Peirce, became evidence. Since then, psychologists made a significant
progress in understanding of human cognition. The perceptual process includes the
selection of a stimulus for attention, its organisation into a meaningful pattern and
an interpretation of the significance of the stimulus. Language plays an important
role in perception shaping [48, pp. 79 - 87]. Several types of perceptual errors are
possible and among them is the so-called perceptual defence, which «provides a
measure of protection against information, ideas that are threatening to an existing
perception or viewpoint. It is a process that encourages the perception of stimuli in
terms of the known and familiar» [48, p. 93]. It is perceptions that determine to a
large  extent  the  behaviour  of  actors.  In  this  sense,  the  social  reality,  a  reality  of
actions based on beliefs and habits, is subjective.
Mechanism of perception and knowledge acquisition is conceived in modern
cognition science as a process of categorisation: «The categories we construct and
employ to structure the world can be construed as entities deeply imbued with our
own experiences as human agents; sometimes they may be heavily constrained by
the properties of the real world, at other times the correspondence may be highly
metaphorical. As we have not been afforded a privileged or God-like insight into
the properties of the real world, we have no independent means of knowing exactly
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which is which» [94, p. 77]. There exist actually two approaches to categories:
similarity-based and explanation-based: «The similarity-based view holds that
instances of a category are represented mentally by the degree to which they are
similar to other known instances of the category. The explanation-based view, on
the other hand, argues that instances of a category are related by an explanatory
structure» [84, p. 77]. Arthur Denzau and Douglas North describe the cognition
process in the following way: «Categories-classifications gradually evolve from
earlier childhood on in order to organize our perceptions and keep track of our
memory of analytic results and experiences. Building on these categories we form
mental models to explain and interpret the environment, typically in ways relevant
to some goal(s). Both the categories and mental models will evolve to reflect the
feedback derived from new experiences – feedback that may strengthen and
confirm our initial categories and models or that may lead to modifications»
[17, p. 224]. These modifications can be of two types: changes in details
concerning existing categories and changes of categories.  Denzau and Douglas use
the term «representational redescription» to characterise the latter type which is a
reorganization of the categories and concepts with sudden shifts in viewpoints
[17, p. 225]. To our mind the notion of representational redescription is very close
to the notion of abduction of Peirce. Contrary to Cartesianism the Pragmatism
attributed a modest role in human reasoning to deduction. The modern cognition
science supports this position of Pragmatism. Cross-cultural studies provided
support for an approach which suggests that people do not engage in deductive
reasoning in the real world. Instead, their judgements are based on categorisation
and instances of a category are represented mentally by the degree by which they
are similar to (have overlapping attributes with) an abstract representation of the
category [84, pp. 115, 374].
At present, many social scientists, especially economists, are convinced
Cartesians. They think that cognition process in economic science is primarily
deductive process and empirical work in this domain is not very much appreciated.
The dominance of Cartesianism in economics can be explained in terms of Peirce’s
investigating communities. Economic realities are very complex, determined to a
large degree by cultural heritage but at the same time very dynamic. Knowledge
concerning these realities for different countries, and even for different regions and
different economic sectors inside the same countries, in different periods of time
can hardly be presented on the basis of the same categories. It means that
communication between members of the modern community of academic
economists, which is to a great extent international, is difficult. In this situation
advantages of the creation of communities of academic economists on the basis of
Cartesianism rather than Pragmatism are obvious. Cartesian approach creates
unlimited possibilities for communicating inside the world community of academic
economists on the basis of universal categories without much care about historical
and geographical differences. In addition empirical work is very hard and
apparently less pleasant than purely armchair «theoretical» work.  Douglas North
underlines: «There is a lack of empirical work on the subject <…> When Lee
Alston, Thrain Eggertsson and I were working on a book of reading on empirical
studies in new institutional economics, we had difficulty finding a sufficient
number  of  case  studies  to  use.  The  reason  is  that  few  have  been  done»
[60, pp. 8, 9]. The most important cause of the crisis in mainstream economics is
its remoteness of the actual economic activities.
~ 32 ~
Математичне моделювання в економіці, №3, 2015
Mainstream economics is also rooted in positivism. The founder of positivism,
August Comte, professed to consider all phenomena as subject to «natural laws».
He saw the role of  «positive science» in discovering these laws and the reduction
to  a  minimum  of  their  number  [12].  Neoclassical  economics  is  in  this  sense  a
«positive science». All generalisations of this economics were based on natural
laws theory. In spite of the fact that a lot of rhetoric concerning the natural laws has
disappeared from the discourse of the contemporary neoclassical thought, this
economics is still founded  on the epistemology based on the concept of these laws
[7, p. 65]. The positivism of 19th century, that of August Comte, has been altered
in the middle of the 20th century in the logical empiricism, which is characterised
by the hypothetico-deductive approach: «The first step in testing a scientific theory
was to deduce certain empirical predictions from the theory and its initial
conditions. The second step was to check these predictions against the
observational evidence; if the empirical predictions turned out to be true, the theory
was confirmed, and if these predictions turned out to be false, the theory was
disconfirmed. In either case, it was not induction, but rather the deductive
consequences of a scientific theory, that were relevant to its empirical support (…)
Hypothetico-deductive method allowed scientific theories to be «based on»
empirical observations (deductively) without actually being «built up from» those
observations (inductively)» [15, p. 376]. We can see here very clearly a
manifestation of Cartesianism: «Cut off from observation as a source of truth, the
Cartesian mind puts great on «testing» to reaffirm its realism. But testing is not a
guarantee of correct ideas because, having lost its mooring in reality, the economic
mind has created so many conundrums, puzzles and purely mental constructs that
testing proves everything and nothing» [52, p. 41]. Since Milton Friedman [26] the
neoclassical economics affiliates openly to positivism by adopting the hypothetico-
deductive approach. The table below shows the difference between positivist and
pragmatist paradigms.
Table 1 – Basic characteristics of positivist and pragmatist paradigms
Positivist paradigm Pragmatist paradigm
Basic
assump-
tions
The world is external and objective
The observer is independent
Science is value free
The world is socially constructed and
subjective
The observer is an integral part of
what is observed
Science is moved by human interests
Basic
charac-
teristics of
research
Data presents objective facts
Context is given a priori
Sublimation of complexity
Logic of verification
Data presents subjective meanings
Context is apprehended a posteriori
Taking into account of complexity
Logic of discovery
The
resear-
cher must:
Elaborate concepts in such a way
that they could be measured
Find causality links and
fundamental laws
Reduce the phenomena to their
simplest elements
Formulate hypotheses and test them
Elaborate concepts rooted in
qualitative and quantitative data
Try to understand the phenomenon
under study
Observe every situation in its totality
Develop ideas by analysing data
Source : (Usunier, Easterby-Smith and Thore, 2000, p. 37) and (Mucchielli,
1996, p. 197)  adapted by the author.
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Let me comment just one line in this table which is dealing with complexity.
The founder of positivism, Auguste Comte, professed to simplify observed
phenomena before explaining them. Social sciences and in particular economics
followed this positivist tradition. The scholars reduced phenomena under study to a
certain number of quantitative variables or made a synthetic description before
starting an analysis. In this way the positivist approach in general and the
quantitative approach in particular sublime or deny the complexity of phenomena
under study. On the contrary the pragmatist approach in social sciences, associated
with the qualitative research, does not reject the complexity but tries to manage it
in the research process. This approach foresees rich and thick descriptions in order
not to lose some crucial information. These descriptions often take the form of
quotations from interviews. The descriptions incorporated in an article or a book do
not represent raw data but are chosen as significant. They are ranged according to
the constructed categories and accompanied by comments. In this way they
represent an important part of the reasoning and allow the readers to make their
own judgements concerning results of the research.
The pragmatist philosophy of Charles S. Peirce according to his own words
corresponds to the experimentalist’s mind [66, pp. 331, 332]. An experimentalist
«has had his mind molded in the laboratory (…) With intellects of widely different
training from his own, whose education has largely been a thing learned out of
books, he will never become inwardly intimate, be he on ever so familiar terms
with  them;  for  he  and  they  are  as  oil  and  water,  and  though  they  be  shaken  up
together, it is remarkable how quickly they will go their several mental ways,
without having gained more than a faint flavor from the association» [66, p. 331]. I
am afraid that such an experimentalist’s type of person is quasi inexistent in the
community of academic economists. The university education and training do not
foster an interest to do field studies and even more this kind of studies are
considered as something inappropriate for «highly qualified economists». I can
imagine that Table 1 above is absolutely indigestible for economists to whom
«data» are exclusively writings of other economists or statistical data at most. This
table will leave them totally insensitive.
In June 2000 a group of French students of economics published an open letter
to professors and other responsible for teaching of this discipline [27, pp. 13 - 14].
The  first  part  of  this  letter  was  as  follows:  «Most  of  us  have  chosen  to  study
economics so as to acquire a deep understanding of the economic phenomena with
which the citizens of today are confronted. But the teaching that is offered, that is
to say for the most part neoclassical theory or approaches derived from it, does not
generally answer this expectation. Indeed, even when the theory legitimately
detaches itself from contingencies in the first instance, it rarely carries out the
necessary return to the facts. The empirical side (historical facts, functioning of
institutions, study of the behaviours and strategies of the agents . . .) is almost
nonexistent. Furthermore, this gap in the teaching, this disregard for concrete
realities, poses an enormous problem for those who would like to render
themselves useful to economic and social actors» [27, p. 13]. I believe that this is a
very pragmatist declaration. The students requested practical knowledge for
practical actions. The movement which was born after the French students revolt of
teaching economics has received the name «the post-autistic economics
movement»: «The main reason why the teaching of microeconomics (or of
«microfoundations» of macroeconomics) has been called «autistic» is because it is
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increasingly impossible to discuss real-world economic questions with
microeconomists  – and with almost  all  neoclassical  theorists.  They are trapped in
their system, and don’t in fact care about the outside world any more» [33, p. 2].
The autistic character of standard economics has deep philosophical roots in
Cartesianism and positivism.
The dominance of positivist paradigm in economics makes it absolutely useless
in the investigation of burning economic problems of the present. Many economists
are not aware of and/or are indifferent to this situation. Of course there is a sizable
and growing minority who do not subscribe to the neoclassical model or who reject
the anti-scientific fundamentalism that surrounds it, but no means existed for
mobilising them as a community [27, p. 2]. In order to respond to the most
important requirement of the open letter of French students, «We wish to escape
from imaginary worlds!», this community should be not only anti-neoclassical but,
what is more important, it should be pragmatist. It means that the subject-matter of
alternative economics should correspond to socio-economic reality which is the
reality of beliefs and habits. It means also that the method of this economics should
follow the logic of discovery and the elaboration of its concepts should be rooted in
qualitative and quantitative data. The method should help to observe the situation
in its totality with taking into account its complexity. The method should be
oriented not to creating sophisticated intellectual constructions but to
understanding the phenomenon under study in order to help to solve real life
problems. A set of methods of this type is called Qualitative Research.
2. Subject-matter of pragmatist institutional economics
The Pragmatism gives us the key for understanding social realities by indicating
that they are beliefs and habits (rules). By defining the subject-matter of pragmatist
institutional economics we have to be more precise. We must say what we mean by
institutions, their relation to beliefs, and propose a scheme for analysis of economic
activity in order to indicate the place of institutions and beliefs in this activity. On
the basis of the definition of institution and the scheme of analysis of economic
activity the subject-matter of pragmatist institutional economics can be defined.
The institution can be defined as typification of habitualised actions [4, p. 72].
The literature on institutional economics contains a large number of definitions of
institutions.  May be the most condensed of them are the following: «The major
role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but
not necessary efficient) structure to human interaction» [58, p. 6]; «Institutions are
durable systems of establishes and embedded social rules and conventions that
structure social interactions» [39, p. 163]. It is important to distinguish formal and
informal rules and to know how they are enforced [58; 61]. Usually formal rules
take the written form and the informal do not. Most of the institutions in modern
societies are made up of both formal and informal rules. In stable institutions
informal rules complement formal ones. In emergent institutions earlier embedded
informal rules can contradict to newly introduced formal rules and distort or even
block their application. As we saw in the previous section of this paper, according
to Pragmatism habits (rules) are closely linked with, based on, beliefs. Similar to
rules, the beliefs can be «formal» and «informal». «Formal» beliefs are often
depicted in documents of political parties and their more or less coherent sets
represent ideologies. «Informal» beliefs do not take a written form. Among beliefs
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it is important to distinguish «values» which provide categorization in evaluative
terms of «good» and «bad». Enforcement of rules is exercised by some human
actions.  These  actions  in  their  turn  follow  some  formal  and  informal  rules.  In
considering only economic institutions the researcher is forced to include in his
analysis «enforcement characteristics» of these institutions [58, 61]. Nevertheless
the enforcement dimension of the institutional analysis can be made by inclusion in
this analysis of non-economic institutions, for example, religious and political. As
rules and beliefs, enforcement of rules can also be «formal» and «informal». The
former represents the prosecution through the law system with a threat of penalties
or imprisonment and the latter, for instance, takes the form of «public opinion»
with a threat of exclusion from a community.
Karl Polanyi distinguished two meanings of economic: substantive and formal.
Classical economics was defined as dealing with production, distribution and
consumption of goods and services. This definition corresponds to the substantive
meaning of economic. Neoclassical economics switched to its formal meaning of
economic. Polanyi gave a substantive definition of economic in institutional terms:
«It can be briefly (if not engagingly) defined as an instituted process of interaction
between man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want
satisfying material means» [69, p. 34]. Economic activity, as the flow of economic
actions, in its substantive meaning, can be analysed at four levels.
Table 2 – Scheme for analysis of economic activity1
No Level of analysis Analysed units Links between analysed units
1 Cognitive Beliefs Complementarity/contradiction
2 Institutional Rules Complementarity/contradiction
3 Organisational Decision-making centres Power relations
4 Technological Resource processing units Material/informational flows
There are top-down links between these four levels. Beliefs determine the rules
in the framework of which power relations took place between decision-making
centres. Decision making centres determine the functioning of resource processing
units and control material and informational flows between them. There are also
down-up feedbacks between levels. Technological level provides signals to
organisational level to make possible correct decision-making. Different natural
and juridical persons (decision making centres) using their power try to change
rules in their favour. Finally, problems emerging in the functioning of decision-
making centres in the framework of existing rules push them to change their
beliefs. The choice of level for analysis of economic activity depends of the
objective of the study. If the researcher is concerned with the result of economic
activity at particular moments, then major attention is likely to be devoted to the
technological level. On the contrary, if the researcher is concerned not with the end
result of economic activity but with its mechanism operating in a certain period of
time then his attention should be devoted to organisational and institutional levels.
Furthermore if he is concerned with changes in the mechanism of economic
1 Previous versions of this scheme were published in Yefimov (1981, 1988, 1997, 2001).
This scheme has some similarities with that of Williamson (2000).
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activity then undoubtedly the main attention should be focused on institutional and
cognitive levels [100, pp. 30 - 31].
Neoclassical  economics  ignores  levels  1  and  2,  and  level  3  is  present  in
neoclassical analysis in a very simplified form with poor collection of decision-
making centres and neglect of power relations. The stress in this analysis is made
on level 4. On the contrary, pragmatist institutional economics should put level 2 in
the centre of its studies supported by analysis of levels 1 and 3. If the research is
oriented to the analysis of institutional functioning, level 2 plays an important role.
If the objective of the research is institutional change, then the analysis at level 1
becomes crucial. In the framework of pragmatist institutional economics,
quantitative analysis of material flows (level 4) can serve only for asking questions
and answers to these questions should be found at higher levels [103, pp. 30 - 31].
By summing up what was said above, we can define the subject-matter of
pragmatist institutional economics in the following way: pragmatist institutional
economics studies economic activity by analysing functioning and change of
institutions that structure economic activity. Analysis of functioning of institutions
requires the taking in account of power relations between actors. The study of
institutional change demands an analysis of beliefs/ideologies shared by different
types of actors.  Briefly, we can say that subject-matter of pragmatist institutional
economics is sets of institutions, in which the human economy, as Karl Polanyi
said, is embedded and enmeshed. In other words, the pragmatist institutional
economics investigates typification of habitualised economic actions and beliefs
linked with these actions. These typifications could take the form of formal rules
(laws and written regulations) and informal rules (customs and traditions). In
modern societies beliefs often take the form of ideologies. Pragmatist institutional
economics is sharply different from neoclassical mainstream economics by subject-
matter which for the former derives from the substantive meaning of economic and
for the latter – from the formal one. I believe that this understanding of the subject-
matter of pragmatist institutional economics corresponds to that of John Commons:
«Peirce’s pragmatism, applied to institutional economics, is the scientific
investigation of economic relations of citizens to citizens. Its subject-matter is the
whole concern of which the individuals are members, and the activities
investigated are their transactions governed not by a law of nature but a working
rule, for time being, of collective action» [10, p. 157].
3. Method of pragmatist institutional economics
Pragmatist institutional economics differs from neoclassical mainstream economics
not only by the subject-matter but also by its method. Generally speaking the
method of pragmatist institutional economics is Pragmatism of Charles Peirce.
Pragmatism as a method of research corresponds to the reality of human cognition
studied by the cognition science and Cartesianism/positivism with its hypothetico-
deductive method does not. Descartes distinguished sharply processes of cognition
of layman and processes of cognition of scientist. The Pragmatism of Charles
Peirce eliminates this sharpness. Why they would be different? Laymen and
scientists  belong  to  the  same  specie  of  human  beings  and  their  brains  are
constructed in the same way. The modern cognition science gives a model of
human behaviour (homo cogitans) and at the same time a method of scientific
research, a method corresponding to the human nature. This model/method consists
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in the categorisation and creation on their basis of mental models in the every day
life and in the research practice. In both cases the categories/concepts and mental
models  are  shared  inside  certain  communities:  «The  world  is  too  complex  for  a
single individual to learn directly how it all works. The entire structure of the
mental models is derived from the experiences of each individual – experiences
that are specific to the local physical environment and the socio-cultural linguistic
environment (…) In fact, no two individuals have exactly the same experiences and
accordingly each individual has to some degree unique perceptions of the world.
Their mental models would tend to diverge for this reason if there were not
ongoing communication with other individuals with a similar cultural background»
[17, pp. 225 - 226].
However some differences between cognition activities of laymen and scientists
do exist and «the crucial difference [is] created by the attempt in science to
maintain the precision in terms as opposed to their plasticity in a popularly held
and communicated mental models, Kuhn argues, the relatively precise nature of
concepts helps keep a paradigm or conceptual framework almost fixed for long
periods» (Ibid., pp. 235-236). The process of accommodation and change in shared
mental models does not always progress smoothly or easily. Ideological purists try
to resist any change (Ibid., p. 226). In this way, professionalization of scientists can
play a negative role in knowledge acquisition process, especially after the strong
institutionalisation of science. This happens in situations of a weak social
(democratic) control or too strong social (authoritarian) control from outside of
scientific communities on the activities of scientists from the point of view of the
quality of knowledge they acquire and hold. Science in general and economics in
particular is a set of institutions which could be analysed on the basis of four level
scheme exposed in Table 2. Rules of recruitment, promotion, publication etc. are
an evolutionary result of ideological, political and financial influences from outside
and inside of scientific communities and of their shared mental models too.
John Commons accepted the term Pragmatism proposed by Peirce as the name
of the method of investigation he applied to economics: «We compelled to
distinguish and use two meanings of pragmatism: Peirce’s meaning of purely a
method of scientific investigation, derived by him from the physical sciences but
applicable also to our economic transactions and concerns; and the meaning of the
various social-philosophies assumed by the parties themselves who participate in
these transactions. We therefore, under the latter meaning, follow most closely the
social pragmatism of Dewey; while in our method of investigation we follow the
pragmatism of Peirce. One is scientific pragmatism – a method of investigation –
the other is the pragmatism of human beings – the subject-matter of the science of
economics» [10, pp. 150, 151]. This method supposes an experimental approach to
investigation, that is the direct contact with investigated subject-matter, i.e.
institutions and beliefs which accompany them. This direct contact can be achieved
by the investigator through studies of different documents, including texts of
formal rules (laws and regulations), use of action research, participant observation,
interviews and case studies. All these techniques should withdraw the cognitive
gap between scholars and actors and in some way enlarge «learning communities»
by partial inclusion in them of actors. In order to catch meanings of observed
events and understand informal rules, participant observations should include
active interviews, which could take the form of «brainstorming» sessions. The
pragmatist methodology rejects an objectivity based on value free neutrality of the
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researcher and proposes a solution to the problem of subject-object relation in
social inquiry.
Pragmatist methodology of social research was developed by the Chicago
sociological school in the framework of Symbolic Interactionism. The author of
this term wrote: «No theorizing, however ingenious, and no observance of
scientific protocol, however meticulous, are substitutes for developing a familiarity
with what is actually going on in the sphere of life under study» [6, p. 39]; «We
must  say  in  all  honesty  that  the  research  scholar  in  the  social  sciences  who
undertakes to study a given sphere of social life that he does not know at first hand
will fashion a picture of that sphere in terms of pre-established images (…) [In the
framework of usual research practices] in place of being tested and modified by
firsthand acquaintance with the sphere of life they [pre-established images] become
a substitute for such acquaintance (…) [In this case] there is no demand on the
research scholar to do a lot of free exploration in the area, getting close to the
people involved in it, seeing it in a variety of situations they meet, noting their
problems and observing how they handle them, being party of their conversations,
and watching their life as it flows along. In place of such exploration and flexible
pursuit of intimate contact with what is going on, reliance is put on starting with a
theory or model, posing a problem in terms of the model, setting a hypothesis with
regard to the problem, outlining a mode of inquiry to test that hypotheses, using
standardized instruments to get precise data, and so forth» [6, pp. 36 – 37]. The last
sentence of this quotation describes exactly in what way most of the economists do
empirical research. This positivist methodology for economics was formulated by
Milton Friedman: «A theory is the way we perceive «facts», and we cannot
perceive «facts» without a theory» [26, p. 34].
 Unfortunately not only neoclassical economists share these Friedman’s views.
Geoffrey Hodgson who is one of the very active authors with «institutionalist
label» confessed: «Contrary to many institutionalist writers, the epistemological
position here is strongly anti-empiricist» [37, p. 24]. He criticised Friedman not for
his Cartesian positivism but on the basis of this «strongly anti-empiricist» position
[37, pp. 28 - 35]. I think that Hodgson is even more Cartesian than Friedman. Let
us discuss his «anti-empiricists» arguments, which are indeed pro-Cartesian
arguments: «The key criticism of empiricist epistemology (…) is that no
observation can be independent of the conceptual framework, language and
theoretical system of the observer. Consequently, no «objective» facts can be
known untainted by the preconceptions of the investigator» [37, p. 35]. The
pragmatist approach does not exclude that the researcher coming to the field has
some preconceptions or pre-established images, but what the pragmatist approach
excludes is determining by them the gathering of data. For example, in 1998 I had
an occasion to attend a meeting, held in a district Administration in Russia, of
heads of collective farms of this district. During this meeting I had the feeling that
we were still somewhere in 1978. In 1999 I started an inquiry in the Russian
countryside, having the preconception of the agrarian institutional continuity in
post-Soviet Russia, but the questionnaires for this inquiry were elaborated not in
the framework of this preconception. These questionnaires [104, pp. 375 - 377]
served as guides for talks with different actors with the objective not to test this
idea but to understand what was going on in different kinds of farms, companies
and administrations.
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The statement «All facts are expressed in some form of language, and an
aconceptual or atheoretical language is impossible» [37, p. 35] is a sophism
because of the use of undefined here notions of «theory» and «language».
«Theories» and «languages» can be of different levels. The statement is true if the
notions of «language» and «theory» are used in the sense of categories and mental
models shared in a certain socio-cultural linguistic environment which can be very
large. For example, if the area under study was the Russian countryside, then
knowledge of Russian language including technical agricultural terms would be
sufficient to begin «observation», i.e. «getting close to the people involved in it,
seeing it in a variety of situations they meet, noting their problems and observing
how they handle them, being party of their conversations, and watching their life as
it flows along». At the same time the statement of Hodgson is false if the notions of
«language» and «theory» are used in the sense of categories and
models/theories/hypotheses shared by a certain community of scholars. For
example, gathering data concerning preconceived variables, quantitative or
qualitative, of a theory and escaping any other information, which could be
collected in the field if it does not enter in this set of preconceived variables, will
make investigator ‘blind’ to many possible insights. In the case of using low level
categories and mental models shared by actors of the area under study the scholar
has a possibility to make a discovery and to reconsider his pre-established image of
the area under study by developing his own new categories and mental models. In
the case of using high level categories and models/theories/hypotheses shared by
members of a certain scientific community the scholar is condemned to be prisoner
of his preconceived variables. He is unable to discover in the field something
outside of his a priori model/theory/hypothesis and what he can do only to «test»
this a priori model/theory/hypothesis.
Geoffrey Hodgson is right by saying that «we cannot ever gain a more accurate
or adequate understanding of economic reality exclusively by observation and the
gathering of data». And it is true not because «contrary to empiricist view, science
cannot progress without a theoretical framework, and no observation of reality is
free of theories or concepts» but because understanding of economic reality can
progress only through «representational redescription», i.e. the correction or even
total change of categories/concepts and models/theories constructed on the basis or
emerged from observation and gathering of data. I agree with professor Hodgson
when, following the sociology of science, he said that «science is a social activity
and its development involves the social generation, scrutinization and acceptance
or rejection of theories, procedures and norms. Consequently, science can never be
«neutral» in the sense that it is entirely free of the biases and preoccupations of
society and the scientific community» [37, p. 36]. But this true statement does not
transform his sophism in a true statement.
A  close  and  reasonably  full  familiarity  with  the  area  of  life  under  study  is
essential to any social researcher [6, p. 37]. A set of methods based on pragmatist
methodology which allow to get this familiarity with area of life under study has
received the appellation of Qualitative Research. The methods included in this set
can be classified as follows: basic or generic qualitative research, ethnographic
study, case study, life story method, phenomenological study, grounded theory and
action research. The two latter methods will be discussed in sections 4 and 5 of this
paper. Below in this section we will characterise briefly general features of
qualitative research methods in general. All qualitative research methods use as
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sources of information existing texts, semi-directive interviews and participant
observation.  Institutional economists should pay special attention to juridical (laws
and regulations) and political (programmes of parties and associations and
declarations of political leaders) texts. The former reflect formal rules and the latter
existing beliefs. In order to collect information on the informal rules and shared
beliefs, including values, the researcher should use semi-directive interviews and
participant observation. Data on habits and beliefs can hardly be numerical. That is
why methods used in the framework of the pragmatist paradigm are primarily
qualitative. This paradigm integrates the observer and the observed in the
procedures of observation. It is attentive to find meanings of actions of the
concerned  actors.  In  the  framework  of  this  paradigm  the  researcher  takes  into
consideration the complexity of the situation under study and intentions,
motivations, expectations, reasoning, beliefs and values of actors [56, p. 34].
Qualitative research can analyse data at several levels: «At the most basic level,
data are organized chronologically or sometimes topically and presented in a
narrative that is largely, if not wholly, descriptive.  Moving from concrete
description of observable data to a somewhat more abstract level involves using
concepts to describe phenomena (…) This is the process of systematically
classifying data into some sort of schema consisting of categories, themes or types.
The categories describe the data, but to some extent they also interpret the data. A
third level of analysis involves making inferences, developing models, or
generating theory» [51, p. 187]. Some categories can be of similarity-based type
when the others are of explanation-based type. The process of qualitative research
can  be  characterised  as  a  progressive  move  from actors’  meaning  to  researcher’s
meaning (sense).
The most important characteristics of qualitative research are the following
[51, pp. 6 – 8, 61]:
1. Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meanings people
have constructed, that is, how they make sense of their world and the experiences
they have in the world. It is assumed that meaning is embedded in people’s
experiences and that the meaning is mediated through the investigator’s own
perceptions. The key concern is understanding the phenomenon of interest from the
participants’ perspectives, not the researcher’s.
2. Qualitative researcher uses his data not to answer questions like how much
or how often but to discover what occurs, the implications of what occurs, and the
relationships linking occurrences. In this case his sample, i.e. people contacted, has
not to be large and random but has to correspond to this purpose. Purposeful
sampling serves to the investigator to discover, understand, and gain insight and
therefore he must select a sample from which the most can be learned. The size of
the sample can be determined gradually: sampling continues until a point of
saturation is reached, i.e. no new information is forthcoming from new sampled
units.
3. The researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis. It
determines by a creative character of communication with actors and abductive
nature of data analysis (insights).
4. Qualitative research usually involves fieldwork. An occasional qualitative
study could be undertaken using documents alone, but these are exceptions.
5. The product of a qualitative research is richly descriptive.
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Table 3 displays a comparison of characteristics of qualitative research with the
more familiar positivist-quantitative approach. The dichotomy indicated in this
table does not exclude the use of quantitative methods in the framework of a
qualitative research.
Table 3 – Characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research
Points of
comparison
Quantitative Research Qualitative Research
Philosophical
roots
Cartesianism, positivism Pragmatism, phenomenology
Goal of
investigation
Prediction, confirmation,
hypothesis testing
Understanding, description,
discovery, meaning, hypothesis
generation
Design Predetermined, structured Flexible, evolving, emergent
Sample Large, random, representative Small, non-random, purposeful
Data collection Inanimate instruments
(statistical data, surveys,
questionnaires)
Researcher as primary instrument,
semi-directive interviews,
observations, documents
Mode of analyses Deductive and inductive (by
statistical method)
Abductive (by researcher)
Findings Precise, numerical Comprehensive, holistic, expansive,
richly descriptive
Source: [51] adapted by the author.
4. Theorising in pragmatist institutional economics
The pragmatist institutional economics was founded by John R. Commons. The
school of thought launched by him is often accused to create no theories as neo-
classical economists do1.   Mainstream  economists  try  in  vain  to  find  in  texts  of
institutionalists deductive theories based on a priori axioms: «The institutionalists
seem to have suffered from a methodological confusion regarding the nature of
theory. They thought a description was a theory» [92, p. 187]; «Theory was never
Commons’s metier. When he calls his «theories» are exclusively poorly wrought
and somewhat lackadaisical classifications and sub-classifications of phenomena as
they appear to him from the dimly held and mainly intuitive conception impossible
to define» [77, p. 124]. Geoffrey Hodgson who has the Cartesian vision of
institutional economics has been trapped in the same way: «Commons did not have
the statute of a major theorist such as Alfred Marshall or Karl Marx. Furthermore,
he did not have the aptitude for careful definitions or logical chains of reasoning»
[39, p. 548]. John Commons spoke about theorizing in the Max Weber’s sense:
«[The Weber’s contribution] converts the whole process of theorizing from a
«theory», in the older sense of the logical consistency of reality, to the mere
methodology of constructing intellectual tools to be used in investigation. There is
no longer a question of antagonism between theory and practice, for a theory is a
tool for investigating practice» [10, p. 722]. Commons underlines that the «search
for the meaning of human activities can never be expected to yield an «exact»
science, or even an approximation to the quantitative requirements of other
1 See for example the section on American institutionalism of the book of Mark Blaug (1985).
~ 42 ~
Математичне моделювання в економіці, №3, 2015
sciences. Yet that is not wanted, anyhow. What the economist wants is
understanding, and he wants measurement only as an aid to understanding»
[10, p. 723].
The discussion in section 3 of this paper of militant Cartesian position of
Geoffrey Hodgson makes here unnecessary a critical assessment of his following
statement: «In the interwar period institutionalism was actually the dominant
school of economic thought in the US. It lost ground to neoclassical formalism
partly because it neglected its own task of underlying theoretical development. It is
not difficult to see how institutionalism became bogged down. After establishing
the importance of institutions, routines and habits, it underlined the value of largely
descriptive work on the nature and function of politico-economic institutions.
Whilst this was of value it became the predominant and almost exclusive practice
of institutionalist writers. The institutionalists became data-gatherers par
excellence. The error here was largely methodological and epistemological, and
committed by many institutionalists with the exception of Veblen himself and few
others.  It  was  a  crucial  mistake  simply  to  clamour  for  descriptive  «realism»,  by
gathering more and more data, or by painting a more and more detailed picture of
particular economic institutions» [37, pp. 21 - 22].
It is true that pragmatist roots of original (old) institutional economics prevented
the creation of context-free, a-historical, theoretical purely deductive constructions.
This is not a handicap of pragmatist institutional economic theories not to be
deductive but abductive, but this is their important cognitive advantage. I believe
that Polanyi meant this kind of theory to deal with substantive concept of economic
which derives from fact unlike the formal concept of economic which derives from
logic [69, p. 31]. Theorising in pragmatist institutional economics can be nothing
else than a creation of sets of concepts with their interrelations coming from «a
close  and  reasonably  full  familiarity  with  the  area  of  life  under  study».  These
concepts must be deeply rooted (grounded) in the data gathered about rules and
shared meanings. Most of this data can be collected exclusively through direct
contacts with actors. As we underlined in the first section of this paper, economic
realities are very complex, determined to a large degree by cultural heritage but at
the same time very dynamic. Knowledge concerning these realities for different
countries, and even for different regions and different economic sectors inside the
same countries, in different periods of time can hardly be presented on the basis of
the same categories/concepts. Complexity, cultural diversity and dynamics of
economic realities have as a consequence the impossibility of creation of theories
useful for political and economic actors covering all these realities. That is why
pragmatist institutional economics is determined as a discipline only by its subject-
matter, method and very general key concepts like belief, habit, ideology,
institution and some others. For most of the investigations other created concepts
are inevitably contextual.
Special guidelines for producing this kind of theories were called Grounded
Theory methodology [20, 29, 47, 85, 86]. Grounded theory was defined by its
elaborators as a discovery of theory from data [29, p. 1]. Grounded theory
methodology is a continuation of methodology of symbolic interactionism and is
the most sophisticated version of qualitative research. According to this
methodology, a theory must be generated not in an armchair but in the field. The
process of data collection and the generation of a theory are not totally separated.
The investigator collects documents and contacts actors to get data for analysis.
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He/she tries to set aside theoretical ideas during data collection and initial stages of
their analysis. He/she does it «in order to assure that the emergence of categories
will not be contaminated by concepts more suited to different areas» [20, p. 4].
Categories have to emerge from (created on the basis of) texts of documents and
transcripts of interviews. The categories discovered by the investigator are not just
names of some pieces of data but reflect meanings of these pieces of data. The
categories formulated by the researcher are the result of an abductive process of
detailed creative analysis of texts of documents and transcripts of interviews. This
process is oriented to capturing insights. The interviews led by the investigator are
active: interviews are based on approximate questionnaires and the interviewer lets
speak  the  actor;  interviewed  actors  are  not  considered  by  the  analyst  as  passive
«subjects» and the interviews can even take the form of brainstorming sessions.
The decisions concerning data collection are taken gradually following the
process of emergence (creation) of categories: «Beyond the decisions concerning
initial collection of data, further collection cannot be planned in advance of the
emerging theory» [29, p. 47]. The founders of the grounded theory called this type
of data collection Theoretical Sampling: «Theoretical sampling is the process of
data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes,
and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them,
in order to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is
controlled by emerging theory…» [29, p. 45]. Under theoretical sampling, data
collection stops when new data does not influence the established categories, their
properties and the links between categories: «As a study proceeded, however, ideas
would become more focused, and the methods could correspondingly become more
structured, interviews, for example, might resemble long conversations at the start
of the study, but become highly selective and focused on particular topics (and
therefore much shorter) by its close» [20, p. 6].
It is important to choose one or several core categories among the generated
categories: «Through the process of integrating categories, a central theoretical
framework could crystallize around a «core» category (…) A framework would
«solidify» out the analysis and delimit the research by differentiating between core
and peripheral categories and identify the scope and boundaries of the theory. This
framework could in turn direct further data collection and analysis – but with a
more circumscribed and focused agenda» [Ibid., p. 9]. During the analytic process
the number of categories may be reduced and the theory can be formulated with
smaller set of higher level concepts [29, p. 110]. The generated categories are
hypotheses which help to understand the phenomena under study. According to
Commons «it  is  a  synthesis,  which helps to  formulate  a  hypothesis,  for  it  sets  up
the following problem: What is the meaning of the activities in their relations to
each others? And thus suggests the kind of hypothesis needed to select the facts
and weigh their relative importance. It is a synthesis of all the factors out of which
we formulate a hypothesis. It differs from the theory of Menger as synthesis differs
from analysis» [10, p. 723].
When the abductive process of generation of categories is finished, the analyst
determines deductively the consequences of hypotheses-categories and their links.
Once a grounded theory is generated, the theory as a whole and its parts could be
tested from the deduced consequences on the basis of statistical methods, which
involve application of logical operation of induction. The result of this operation
could be a rejection of the generated theory as a whole or its parts. It could mean
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that the detailed data used for theory generation was not really representative.
Though the pragmatist methodology of social research does not reject quantitative
methods but rejects substitution of theory generation on the basis of data by testing
of an a priori theory elaborated exclusively in an armchair. In this way the
grounded theory methodology solves in a convincing way the problems of data
sample size and data representativity.
Direct application of the grounded theory methodology to economic realities
produces  context  embedded  theories.  It  is  clear  that  for  this  type  of  theories  the
continuity of pragmatist institutional research can be more methodological than
substantive. But it does not mean that every grounded theory research is an isolated
investigation from the scratch. Some important theoretical substantive continuity is
possible in the framework of the same or close contexts. In the latter case the
comparative analysis of several grounded theories could produce
categories/concepts of a higher level which would form new more abstract theory
embracing several contexts at the same time. For example a study of market
institutions in developed capitalist countries at the turn of the 21st century made in
[24] can be considered as a grounded theory of the second order (level), i.e. a
generalisation of grounded theories based on «a close and reasonably full
familiarity» with particular industries in particular countries and in a particular
period of time.
Grounded Theory methodology is nothing else but an explicit application of
human cognition scheme to social scientific research. Any real research would
follow it implicitly. This is a very important advantage of this methodology in
comparison with normal, in the sense of normal science, procedures. Its other
advantage is its orientation to discovery which diminishes the probability not to
notice important information concerning the area under study. This probability
diminishes also by the requirement to set aside theoretical ideas during data
collection and initial stages of their analysis. At later stages of analysis the
influence on it of previous theoretical ideas shared by the researcher became
inevitable but these ideas are confronted with data not filtered by these ideas, as in
the normal standard practice, that allows to the researcher to evaluate their
appropriateness. The fact that the most important sources of information for social
research are texts depicting rules (habits) and ideologies (beliefs) determines the
Grounded Theory methodology as the methodology of generation of categories on
the basis of texts.
5. Experimenting in pragmatist institutional economics
Common understanding of science supposes that it has to have theoretical and
experimental parts. If all generations of economists did not deny the necessity of
the presence in their discipline of the theoretical part, their attitude toward the
experimental one was not so obvious. Many economists of the 19th century denied
the possibility of economic experiments. For example John Stuart Mill
characterised political economy as essentially an abstract science, and its method as
the method a priori [35, p. 13]. In his System of Logic (1843) «Mill offers a radical
empirist  view  of  science  and  then  argues  for  a  special  dispensation  to  social
sciences such as economics: a dispensation that is based in part on the absence of
experimental-laboratory control in the social sciences (…) Because experimental (a
posteriori) method is not available in the social domain, the deductive (a priori)
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method is the only method available to economic science. Economics is a
deductive science and only deductive science» [35, pp. 16, 21]. This kind of
attitude is still vital among many economists. At the same time, field (naturalistic)
and laboratory economic experiments began to develop actively in the second part
of the 20th century in the United States. Both types of experiments followed
positivist tradition.
The idea of economic field studies is simple: «If a fundamental policy change is
under consideration, and if there is no clear basis for estimating a priori the effect
of this policy on economic behaviour, then the only way to obtain this information
is to put the policy into practice on a limited scale and to see what happens»
[23, p. 9]. Undertaking this type of experiments is time and resource consuming:
«In terms of time involved, there are one to two years of advance preparation,
anyway from two to ten more years for the conduct of the experiment in the field,
and from one to three years after that for the analysis of the huge amount of data
that have been collected. Even preliminary results may require four to five years of
work from the time the experiment is authorized» [23, p. 23]. In the seventies
hundreds of million of dollars were spent for this kind of experiments for analysis
of consequences of national programmes that had involved hundreds of billions of
dollars (Ibid., p. 2). The experiments were carried out according to natural
sciences’ (positivist) standards: the populations involved were considered as
passive subjects which have to react to established controlled variables and
samples of these populations were determined in advance according to
requirements of statistical criteria. The outcome of these experiments were almost
exclusively numerical data processed with statistical methods. Very soon after the
start of field economic experiments it became clear the difference of social
experiments with experiments in physical and biological sciences: «[the former
type of experiments] introduces a major new dimension of the methodology of
experimentation because humans, unlike other animate or inanimate objects, are
very likely to react to the conditions of the experiment and thereby confound the
results». (Ibid.) This kind of effect has been already noticed earlier (1928) in the
famous Hawthorne experiments.
Field economic experiments can be used not only for analysis of economic
policy consequences but also for understanding of the systems under study: «The
best way to understand something is to try to change it». Transformations in former
communist countries can be considered as large-scale naturalistic economic
experiments. Scholars involved as consultants in these transformations could take
advantage of their participation for deep studies of these processes. They had
opportunities to determine some parameters of these transformations and to
contemplate on the resulting outcome. Close contacts of the consultant with actors
during a long period of time in conditions of manipulations of important real life
parameters (rules and ideologies) provide ideal conditions for pragmatist
institutional research [102, 104]. As all pragmatist based research practices, they
had to follow the logic of discovery and not the logic of verification. They have to
consider actors involved in experiments not as passive «subjects» but as active
participants of the study process. In this case the problem of experimental control
becomes inessential. Multiple naturalistic socio-economic experiments take place
constantly in countries with more stable institutional environment, but usually
economists do not take advantage of these tremendous research opportunities:
scholars and actors in majority of cases remain separated.
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Pragmatist field economic experimenting could use the rich technical base of
Action Research [32, 72, 87]. The main pioneer of action research – Kurt Lewin –
associated the idea of action research with the idea of doing experiments in the
field [72, p. 17]. Now the action research is usually understood as «the whole
family of approaches to inquiry which are participative, grounded in experience
and action-oriented» (Ibid., p. xxiv). Advocates of action research declare
explicitly their affiliation to Pragmatism [32, 46]. In action research, new
knowledge is created through active experimentation. The results are always tested
in  real  life  because  action  research  aims  to  find  solutions  to  real  problems.  The
results are justified through their workability [46, p. 107]: «Action research focuses
on solving context-bound real-life problems. Knowledge production cannot be
done without taking into account the wholeness of a situation. Inquiry is based on
questions emerging from real-life situations as opposed to the conventional
academic way of working where questions arise from within the academic
community which is subdivided into professional fiefdoms. Reading other
researchers’ work as a way of identifying new research questions, the standard
practice is partly supplanted in action research by a more direct process of
researching what social stakeholders understand to be pressing problems (…)
Action researchers do not believe in the idea of scientific, cosmopolitan knowledge
that is valid everywhere, and we reject the notion that valid knowledge can be
produced only by «objective» outsiders using formal methods that supposedly
eliminate bias and error» [46, pp. 105, 110]. Nevertheless action research carried
out for different contexts allows making generalisations and creating higher level
grounded theories. At the same time knowledge of different contexts by action
researchers could be very useful in a particular situation: «By setting the local
situation in the context of these broader comparisons, the professional action
researcher can assist the local group in opening up its sense of the situation and
some options for the future» [32, p. 99].
In action research, actors (insiders) and investigators (outsiders) collaborate
closely. Action research can be called cogenerative research: «Local participants
[insiders] are enabled to take charge of the meaning construction process. At the
same time, trained researchers cannot make sense of local social life without secure
communication links to these participants. The dynamic tension between insider
and outsider knowledge is the basis for this cogenerative process (…) The
interaction between local knowledge and expert knowledge through a cogenerative
process is  a  core feature of  action research.  One consequence of  this  is  that  most
accounts of action research, trying to be true to the process that constructed them,
are rendered in narrative form» [Ibid., p. 113, 123].
Laboratory economic experimentation as field experimentation can also follow
positivist and pragmatist approaches. The author of this paper devoted more than
ten years to pragmatist laboratory experimental economics [99; 100; 101]. I was a
pure neoclassical economist during my graduate and PhD studies [98]. After the
disappointment in trying to investigate functioning of the Soviet economy on the
basis of this approach, I moved for a short period of time to the behavioural
approach [14, 80] but it was again a disappointment: even computer simulation
models required too strong assumptions on human behaviour. The solution for me
was very natural and simple: if we cannot simulate with formal models the
behaviour of humans, let’s invite these humans to simulate their own behaviour in
laboratory conditions when their environment (responses to their decisions) is
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simulated by computer simulation models. Once engaged in this way, the logic of
the research has brought me to accept the pragmatist approach for gaming-
simulation [99] as a basis for modelling and laboratory experimenting in the
framework of institutional economics [100]. On the basis of this approach a large
scale gaming simulation model was developed as a basis for laboratory
experiments with the objective of comparative analysis of different economic
systems [101]. The economic systems of two particular countries (Soviet Union
and Hungary) were presented in this model by rules which depicted national
economic legislations [101, pp. 43 - 69].
The method of gaming-simulation gives possibility to organise laboratory
economic experiments as a research process which follows the pragmatist logic of
theory/hypothesis discovery. Abductive discovery procedures are organised in this
kind of laboratory experiments on the basis of a dialogue between scholars
(experimenters) and players-participants (experienced actors and experts in the area
of  real  life  under  study),  as  a  special  form  of   «brainstorming  session»
accompanied by a computer simulation model managed by the players-participants:
«The group of players and experts can completely coincide with the research group
but it can be extended at the expense of involvement (for the period of research) of
professional managers and scientists, specialists in this particular and neighbouring
field. The composition of participants is considerably dependent on the research
goals and the type of simulation games applied. As the game becomes more
abstract, a higher percent of scientists among the players will be involved. The
more concrete the problem or the game is, the higher is the proportion of
management practitioners. The main emphasis in gaming experiment is given to
joint creative activity of all participants, players included. Their task should not be
confined to that of passive examined subjects. It is just the players who,
collaborating with the experimenters, must make the main contribution to the
solution of the investigated problem. Their gaming activity (the activity while
performing the gaming roles) must be a cause, framework and an empirical basis
for the research (activity apropos of the game). The participants of a gaming
simulation experiment contribute to the solution of the problem in the process of
discussions, filling in questionnaires and making reports as well as other types of
activity apropos of the game» [100, p. 198].
At present the so-called Experimental Economics is developing in the
framework of mainstream economics’ concepts and methodology [16, 25, 36, 43,
82]. In this discipline laboratory experiments are understood as follows: «When I
speak of «laboratory» experiments, I am speaking of experiments in which the
economic environment is very fully under the control of the experimenter, who
also has relatively unimpeded access to the experimental subjects. This
distinguishes laboratory experiments from «field» experiments, in which relatively
few aspects of the environment can be controlled, and in which only limited access
to most of the economic agents may be available» [73, p. 949]. In this more or less
correct vision of economic laboratory experiments we already see the sign of
positivist orientation in calling the participants-players experimental subjects. Most
of Experimental Economics laboratory experiments are carried out with students
(undergraduate and MBA) on the basis of economic equilibrium, game theory, and
utility theory schemes. These laboratory experiments follow the logic of
theory/hypothesis verification in the framework of positivist paradigm. They are
oriented to «creating an experimental environment in which theories being tested
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give unambiguous predictions, and of controlling or measuring the preferences of
experimental subjects», «experimental tests of axiomatic models», «to test
hypothesis, which is that agents in a market environment will behave like utility
maximizers» [Ibid., p. 950, 952, 993]. Another sign of positivism: «Structure of the
experimental design should be planned with consideration for the subsequent
statistical analysis of the hypotheses of interest» [16, pp. 30, 31].
Advocates of neoclassical experimental economics see two main advantages
offered by laboratory methods: replicability and control [Ibid., p. 14]. An unautistic
reader may find unconvincing the following arguments in favour of this kind of
experimental economics: «The economic profession imposes little professional
credibility on the data-collection process, so economic data are typically collected
not by economists for scientific purposes, but by government employees and
businessmen for other purposes (…) But relatively inexpensive, independently
conducted laboratory investigations allow replication»; «Surprising is the lack of
control over data from natural markets sufficient to test even basic predictions of
neoclassical price theory. Consider, for example, the simple proposition that a
market will generate efficient, competitive prices and quantities. Evaluation of this
proposition requires price, quantity, and market efficiency data, given a particular
set of a market demand and supply curves. But neither supply nor demand may be
directly observed with natural data»; «Distinguishing natural data may sometimes
exist in principle, but the data are either not collected or collected too imprecisely
to distinguish among alternative theories. In other instances, relevant data cannot
be collected, because it is simply impossible to find economic situations that match
the assumptions of the theory (sic!). An absence of control in natural contexts
presents critical data problems in many areas of economic research.» [Ibid., p.15].
The disdain of economists for data collection cannot be a rationale for laboratory
economic experiments. Data are understood here as «objective» numerical data.
For an institutional economist most of the data he/she needs is not numerical but
qualitative data representing the meanings of actors and the latter can share this
data  with  investigators.  If  some  theoretical  parameters  cannot  be  in  some  way
empirically approached they have to be abandoned. If it is «impossible to find
situations that match the assumptions of the theory» why collect these data? An
absence of control in natural contexts does not present critical data problems if the
objective of the research is not to predict or to verify but to understand with help of
people acting in these contexts. The only important argument evoked here, which
can be accepted, is the relatively high cost of field data collection but the most
important rationale for economic laboratory experiment has to be found somewhere
else. This rationale is a possibility to plunge a mixed team (scholars and actors) of
participants in an environment that does not exist for the moment (for example an
introduction of a new economic legislation) and investigate problems arising in this
environment. Preference for laboratory to field experiments could come either from
cost considerations or from potential undesirable (dangerous) consequences of the
field experiments. Most of the data in these experiments are produced by the
participants. In addition a computer simulation model, which provides feedback of
decisions made by players, can also supply data for this investigation.
Cartesian/positivist nature of neoclassical experimental economics can be seen
in a priori microeconomic systems [81] at the basis of its experimental situation
design and in the role of players-participants. In addition to the usual a priori
conceived elements of microeconomic, game or utility theories, microeconomic
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system contain a priori rules, which neoclassical authors misleadingly called
institutions. The latter represents abstractions of similar type to an abstraction of
the auctioneer in the microeconomic general equilibrium model. As it was already
mentioned, participants in neoclassical laboratory economic experiments are
considered as «subjects» and are recruited among undergraduate and MBA
students. In this kind of experiments «participants receive salient rewards that
correspond to the incentives assumed in the relevant theory (…) Also, as a general
matter, rewards are monetary» [16, pp. 24, 25]. In order to guarantee an
«unbiaseness» of participants’ behaviour, the experimenters make a lot of efforts to
prevent participants from discovering objectives of the experiment.
The methodology of pragmatist gaming simulation experiments is the opposite.
Most of the data generated by these experiments are not quantitative but
qualitative. The experimental situation as the whole experimental design is based in
this kind of experiments not exclusively on abstractions, but primarily on results of
preliminary field studies. The central concept of pragmatist gaming simulation
experimentation is the concept of players’ dual behaviour: «A game assumes
simultaneous realisation (but not sequential alternation in time!) of practical and
conventional behaviour. A player must keep in mind that he is taking part in a
conventional (unreal) situation and at the same time ignore the fact (...) The duality
of the player’s behaviour in gaming simulation experiment is manifested in two
types of activity: in the gaming activity [execution of role] and the activity apropos
of the game [research]. Player’s system of motivation should be such as to provide
those necessary proportions of dual behaviour which would not run counter the
purposes of the experiment (…) In an experiment so designed, the players are
directly interested in studying the functioning of the analysed institutions (…) The
emphasis on the aim to win may disturb the necessary level of dual behaviour and
thus devaluate the experiment» [99, pp. 404 - 409].
Conclusion
The Pragmatist Institutional Economics can be outlined in the following way:
1. Economic activity is analysed at institutional level taking largely into
consideration organisational and cognitive levels and to a much lesser degree
technological  level  (see  Table  2  in  section  2  of  this  paper).  It  means  that  in  the
centre of analysis are human interactions.
2. Rules and beliefs behind them that structure human interactions are the most
important analysed units. These rules and beliefs can be formal and informal.
3. Formal  rules  are  written adopted laws and regulations.  ‘Formal’  beliefs  are
ideologies fixed in a written form in manuals, programmes of political parties and
other documents.
4. Informal  rules  and  beliefs  are  shared  by  actors,  members  of  a  certain
community. Very often these rules and beliefs are linked with a cultural heritage of
members of this community. Sometimes informal rules and beliefs are
complementary to formal ones, sometimes it is not the case. The only possible
source of information about informal rules and beliefs, and their complementarity
or  contradiction  to  formal  rules  and  beliefs,  are  members  of  this  community,
bearers of these informal rules and beliefs.
5. The task of the researcher is to contact actors by interviewing them,
participating in their activities (participant observation) or even making the
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research together with them (action research) in order to understand rules and
beliefs that guide their activities.
6. Last but not least, because rules and beliefs of the present almost always
have roots in the past, researchers should study their historical evolution in order to
understand current rules and beliefs.
This outline should orient pragmatist institutional economists in data gathering
concerning certain area under study but no other theory or idea should influence
this process. Some categories made out from the analysis of the data, including
transcripts of interviews, could mark some discovered phenomena when others
could contribute to the understanding of discovered or already met phenomena.
The pragmatist institutional research should follow the logic of discovery of
unknown and understanding of this unknown based on the collected data and
should not follow the logic of verification of some preconceived theories or
hypothesis.
This paper is an appeal to economists to adopt the pragmatist method. This
method, in its modern form related to social sciences, is Qualitative Research. It is
called «qualitative research» because it deals with primarily qualitative data but its
most important characteristic is its affiliation to the pragmatist paradigm (see
Table 1 in section 1). The modern cognition science confirms as realist this
pragmatist paradigm of research. Table 3 in section 3 of the paper shows the
difference between the qualitative research and more traditional quantitative
research which follows the positivist paradigm. The qualitative research includes
basic or generic qualitative research, ethnographic study, case study, life story
study, phenomenological study, grounded theory and action research. For data
gathering it uses existing texts, semi-directive interviews and participant
observation. Among different types of qualitative research Grounded Theory for
theorising and Action Research for field experiments are most advanced. Grounded
Theory can be considered as an explicit application of the model of cognition for
social research. The core of this model elaborated by cognition science is the
process of categorisation. Grounded Theory is a method of theorising based on
collecting and gradual processing of qualitative data with the objective of creation
of categories/concepts emerging from this data. Action Research method supposes
the highest degree of contacts between researchers and actors in the framework of
experiments and in this way it reduces the cognition gap between them and creates
some kind of a larger investigating community interested in the success of the
research. At last, pragmatist experimental institutional economics carry out
economic experiments in the form of gaming simulation which may be considered
as institutional modelling [100]. Participants in these experiments are not
considered as passive subjects, they are not undergraduate students but real actors,
and take part in the research process which could be characterised as some kind of
brainstorming sessions in a mixed team of actors and researchers on the basis of a
computer based simulation.
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